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Introduction
Saving money for the future is among the most central economic decisions private households have to make on an ongoing basis. Therefore, saving behavior has always been a major eld of interest in economic research (see, e.g., Kotliko 1989, Browning and Lusardi 1996) . While the complexity of the saving decision renders the development of only one general theory basically impossible, researchers have always tried to disentangle the importance of certain factors that inuence saving behavior. These include a great number of economic, psychological, sociological, and institutional factors. The focus of my paper lies in the realm of the precautionary motive for saving, i.e., the importance of future income or expenditure uncertainty for saving behavior. In particular, this empirical analysis contributes to the existing empirical evidence by focusing on the adaptation of household saving to changes in perceived job insecurity over time. 1 The eect of job insecurity on saving in Germany is of special interest for two reasons: First, in times of increasing job insecurity, it is important to know if or to what extent people adapt their saving and thus their consumption behavior. For instance, the eect of a policy intervention to stimulate private consumption during a recession could be heavily dampened if households use the additional resources not for consumption, but for saving. Second, demographic change puts pressure on the public social security systems in Germany which are funded mainly through employee and employer contributions. A need for complementing private insurance has been addressed concerning old-age provisions and health insurance, but much less so for the risk of unemployment. A fairly generous public unemployment insurance scheme can even crowd out private insurance (Gruber 1998, Engen and Gruber 2001) . And a lack of private savings can have very negative nancial consequences for households that are hit by a job loss: Keese (2009) shows that unemployment is one of the main triggers of severe over-indebtedness of households in Germany.
Theoretical models and numerical simulations predict that even small amounts of income uncertainty can lead households to increase their savings substantially, which points to the importance of the precautionary motive in explaining individual as well as aggregate savings (e.g., Skinner 1988 , Zeldes 1989 . Over the last twenty years, researchers have tried to conrm these predictions empirically (see Browning and Lusardi (1996) or Geyer (2011, Appendix B, Table 13 ) for comprehensive surveys). Today, there exists a sizable number of empirical studies yielding very mixed results ranging from no importance to great importance of the precautionary saving motive.
For Germany, there are a number of recent empirical studies by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) , Essig (2005b) , Bartzsch (2008) , Fuchs-Schündeln (2008) , Schunk (2009) , Fossen and RostamAfschar (2009) , Beznoska and Ochmann (2010) , Geyer (2011) and Arent (2012) that address the precautionary saving motive explicitly. This interest is not surprising since Germany is an interesting country to study household saving behavior since it appears to contradict the familiar textbook version of the life-cycle theory of consumption and saving (Börsch-Supan and Essig 2003, p. 3) . In particular, the generosity of the German public unemployment insurance and social security system might signicantly reduce the need for private saving to insure against income uncertainty arising from a possible job loss.
In light of the existing literature, the study at hand can be seen as a replication study that focuses on the particular aspect of adaptation of saving behavior over time. Instead of looking at wealth holdings from a life cycle perspective as in the classical precautionary savings theory, I investigate if and to what extent short-term saving behavior responds to changes in subjectively perceived job insecurity. To this end, I use large-scale individual-and household-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) that allow me to study the link between job insecurity and saving behavior in detail. The empirical analysis accounts for the subjective nature of the risk measure, unobserved heterogeneity among households and the saving measure being left-censored at zero.
Overall, perceived job insecurity is not strongly and rather negatively related to household saving behavior. A household's nancial situation plays an important role in this context. A small positive correlation of job insecurity and saving as precautionary behavior would imply is found for households that are somewhat worried about their nancial situation: If worried about job security, these households increase their saving rate by about 0.3%-points. In contrast, no signicant change in saving is observed for households that are either not at all or very concerned about their nancial situation, i.e., either nancially constrained or already in possession of a buer-stock of wealth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the existing empirical literature is briey reviewed to highlight the major challenges for the empirical analysis, focusing on the measurement of saving and risk. In Section 3, the empirical strategy and the data are described.
The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 oers some concluding remarks.
Empirical background
The choice between consumption and saving is at the very center of all economic decisions made by private households. Browning and Lusardi (1996) list a total of nine possible motives why people save, including the precautionary, the life-cycle, the intertemporal substitution, and the enterprise motives. Browning and Lusardi (1996) stress that not all motives give rise to the same amount of savings by each and every person: Depending upon preferences, income, age, etc. dierent motives will be of dierent importance to dierent people at dierent times. Disentangling the importance of one single motive is extremely dicult, mainly because they cannot be assumed to be independent of one another. Concerning the study at hand, it is sometimes dicult to draw a clear-cut distinction between precautionary saving and other motives (Browning and Lusardi 1996, p. 1821 ), e.g., savings for retirement could also be used to buer against pre-retirement shocks.
My analysis focuses on the precautionary motive because it seems to be one of the two most important motives, the other being the life-cycle motive. Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003) report that Old-age provision and Saving as a precaution for unexpected events are the two most important saving motives for German households.
2 They nd that only 4% of the respondents judge saving as a precaution to be less important but almost 60% judge it to be of great importance. I conrm this result with data from the 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves of the GSOEP, in which households were asked if they had put aside any money for emergencies. Table 1 reports the respondents' answers.
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While the share of households that possess savings for emergencies has declined continuously from 76% in 2001 to 62% in 2007, the share of households that do not have these savings because of nancial reasons has increased from 79% to 91%. This hints at income constraints playing an important role for the explanation of potentially non-existent precautionary saving behavior of many households. Combining these numbers, only about 5% of the households deliberately choose not to have any nancial reserves for emergencies, i.e., they report not to possess any savings for emergencies because of reasons other than nancial ones. The beginning of empirical studies on the precautionary saving motive is marked by the work of Skinner (1988) . Much of the empirical work has focused on the US and the UK. Recently, a number of studies have used data from Germany to study precautionary saving behavior, including Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) , Essig (2005b) , Bartzsch (2008) , Schunk (2009 ), Fossen and Rostam-Afschar (2009 ), Beznoska and Ochmann (2010 , Geyer (2011) and Arent (2012) . The empirical ndings so far are widely mixed, ranging from none or only limited (e.g., Skinner 1988 , Dynan 1993 , Lusardi 1998 to great importance of the precautionary motive (e.g., Carroll and Samwick 1998, Ventura and Eisenhauer 2005) . For Germany, ndings also vary from a negative correlation between employment or income uncertainty and saving (Essig 2005b , Arent 2012 ) to uncertainty explaining a signicant amount of household savings (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005 , Bartzsch 2008 , Geyer 2011 ). Schunk (2009 nds that the importance of the precautionary saving motive increases over the life-cycle and that heterogeneity in household saving behavior is related to heterogeneity in saving motives. The mixed evidence might lead one to the conclusion that while the precautionary motive is important for some people at some times, it is unlikely to be so for most people (Browning and Lusardi 1996, p. 1838) . Another explanation for the dierent empirical ndings are the vastly dierent estimation strategies employed. Kennickell and Lusardi (2006) list eight potential pitfalls and biases that can arise when estimating precautionary saving. These include the measurement of wealth and risk, the underlying preferences, possible insurance mechanisms, functional specications, and the inuence of other saving motives. A study that traces all of the sources of dierences in conclusions to sample period, sample selection, functional form, variable denition, demographic controls, econometric technique, stochastic specication, instrument denition, etc. (Browning and Lusardi 1996, p. 1822) does not exist and very likely never will exist. The measures that have been used as the dependent variable by empirical researchers can be grouped into three categories: consumption, wealth, and saving. While the choice of modeling consumption, saving or wealth seems to be merely a matter of taste or data availability, there 6 are distinct issues that relate particularly to each measure besides the issue of potentially large measurement error that is common to all of them. Measures of nancial or total wealth are most prominent, and used by, e.g., Lusardi (1997 Lusardi ( , 1998 , Carroll and Samwick (1998), Carroll et al. (2003) , Kennickell and Lusardi (2006) and Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) . The main problem of wealth measures is the determination of the components (which dier in terms of liquidity and accessibility) to include when testing for precautionary savings. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) nd stronger evidence in favor of precautionary savings for measures of nancial than for housing wealth, but Carroll et al. (2003) nd a signicant precautionary motive only for broad measures of wealth that include home equity which typically represents the largest component of wealth for most households. The wealth stock is also heavily inuenced by past events that are not observable in the data. Past shocks might have simultaneously depleted household wealth and raised income insecurity, which would bias ndings against the precautionary motive. Kennickell and Lusardi (2006) use information about desired precautionary wealth from the US Survey of Consumer Finance and nd evidence in favor of the precautionary motive but its quantitative importance seems to be limited.
Direct measures of the ow of saving have been employed by Guariglia (2001) , Fuchs-Schündeln (2008) , Giavazzi and McMahon (2010) and Geyer (2011) who all nd a positive eect of income or policy uncertainty on saving. Many of the above mentioned problems of wealth measures also apply to saving measures, e.g., the type of saving to be included or the relevance of past events. The type of saving is especially important when using self-reported information as in these four studies because the respondents cannot be expected to calculate their saving economically correct. And typically, only positive saving values are observed which renders the dependent variable left-censored at zero. Guariglia (2001), De Lucia and Meacci (2005) and Benito (2006) study the eect of job or income uncertainty on household consumption and nd evidence in favor of the precautionary saving motive even for the consumption of basic necessities such as food. This is somewhat surprising since variation in basic consumption goods can be expected to be fairly low. Dierent income elasticities of dierent consumption goods pose a problem to the estimation of precautionary behavior. Therefore, Benito (2006) also studies the eect on durables consumption, and nds that purchases of durables are delayed when job insecurity increases. In contrast, Stephens, Jr. (2004) does not nd any mitigating eect of prior job loss expectations on consumption declines in case of a realized job loss.
When investigating precautionary saving behavior, the most important explanatory variable is the measure of uncertainty. The central problem that faces anyone who wishes to determine the role of precautionary saving in this way is to identify some observable and exogenous source of risk that varies signicantly across the population (Browning and Lusardi 1996, p. 1835) . Although income is not the only source of uncertainty that people want to insure themselves against, most research has focused on this particular type of risk. Kennickell and Lusardi (2006) see a strong need to move beyond earnings risk when studying precautionary behavior and Kotliko (1989) presents evidence that uncertainty concerning labor earnings as well as uncertainty concerning remaining life time and possible health expenditures can explain great amounts of precautionary savings in life-cycle simulation studies (see also Geyer 2011) . The importance of expenditure risks, such as health and longevity, should not be underestimated, but they should be much less important for the explanation of saving in Germany than in, e.g., the US because of the German social security system 7 which provides coverage for these major risks. Therefore, the focus here is on income uncertainty, and in particular on the risk of becoming unemployed because unemployment represents the biggest threat to income for most households. Doi (2004) nds that unemployment risk but not income uncertainty helps to explain the increase of saving rates in Japan in the 1990's. Other examples of studies that focus on the risk of job loss are Lusardi (1998 ), Carroll et al. (2003 for the US, and Guariglia (2001) as well as Benito (2006) for the UK. While the rst two studies nd signicant but quantitatively limited evidence, the latter two nd rather strong evidence for precautionary behavior due to job insecurity. For Germany, the empirical evidence is mixed (Essig 2005b , Geyer 2011 , Arent 2012 . Perceptions of risk can be asked for directly or approximated with other available data. Several authors use the variance of observed income or consumption processes as risk measures (e.g., Carroll and Samwick 1998 , Bartzsch 2008 , Geyer 2011 . This approach has several shortcomings, the most important being that variation does not necessarily reect risk (Carroll et al. 2003 , Geyer 2011 ). Bonin et al. (2007 criticize these measures for their endogeneity which stems from past choices and individual preferences. If risk aversion and prudence are positively correlated, people might at the same time choose less risky jobs and still save substantial amounts which would lead to a false rejection of the theory. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) provide evidence for the presence of self-selection and a resulting negative bias regarding precautionary wealth. In contrast, Bartzsch (2008) argues that risk averse individuals save less than others. 4 In addition, a positive eect of the income variance on saving might not be due to precaution, but could well reect intertemporal substitution. 5 At rst sight, subjective measures are more attractive because they contain private forward-looking information (Guiso et al. 1992 , Stephens, Jr. 2004 . Kotliko (1989) concludes that pinning down empirically the extent of precautionary saving will require new surveys that examine [. . . ] the extent of subjective uncertainties (p. 30). Guiso et al. (1992) were the rst to use a subjective measure of income risk. They argue that given the unobservable nature of households' perceived uncertainty, there is no alternative as to rely upon direct survey information on the households' subjective assessment of specic risks (p. 309). Alessie and Kapteyn (2001) note the great potential of subjective risk measures for the understanding of saving behavior. A big advantage of subjective measures might actually lie in the possibility that respondents do not precisely answer to one isolated specic question, but include other associated aspects in their answers. Curtin (2003) argues that subjective unemployment expectations contain private forward-looking information as well as publicly available information on economic conditions which makes them useful as measures of future income uncertainty. Most importantly, while people are probably not able to estimate the true risk of losing their job precisely, their consumption and saving behavior should nevertheless be based on their expectations. But of course, subjective measures must always be treated with due caution in empirical applications because they, too, are at risk of being endogenous in many settings. In particular, unobservable third factors might simultaneously aect job loss expectations and saving behavior and induce spurious correlation between these two variables. The potential endogeneity of my risk measure is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2 and addressed in the interpretation of the estimation results in Section 4.
3 Empirical strategy 3.1 Econometric specication
The theory on precautionary saving behavior predicts that higher income or expenditure uncertainty leads to higher saving. The reduced form regression equation typically used to estimate precautionary saving behavior with panel data is specied as follows (e.g., Schunk 2009)
The With the GSOEP saving data, which are described in detail in Section 3.2, it seems reasonable to follow the approach of Giavazzi and McMahon (2010) and use the change, i.e., the rst dierence of the saving rate as the dependent variable:
This regression equation is estimated using a linear xed eects model which splits the error term into a household-specic error α i and the random error it . This approach has two major advantages:
On the one hand, it purges the data from household-specic time trends in the saving rate which Figure 1 suggests exist; on the other hand, this approach eliminates the problem of the saving data being left-censored at zero (Giavazzi and McMahon 2010) . In addition, this approach also deals with the highly right-skewed shape of the saving-rate distribution.
One third of all households report not to be able to put any money aside, i.e., a saving rate of zero.
In the baseline regressions, I also use the level of the household saving rate as well as a dummy variable for having a positive saving rate as dependent variables. The respective regression models are a linear xed eects and a conditional xed eects logit model that only includes household who switch between a zero and a positive saving rate at least once (Chamberlain 1980) . 6 For the saving rate level regressions, three samples are used: all households, only households that report a positive saving rate at least once and only households with a positive saving rates. Therefore, the importance of the censoring issue become implicitly visible by comparing the estimation results for the dierent samples. It does not appear to be of major importance.
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Given the left-censored nature of the dependent variable, a tobit or a sample-selection model might seem most appropriate. However, these models typically impose strong distributional assumptions on the data, and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is dicult. But unobservable individual-or household-specic eects are important for saving behavior. Consequently, Hausman specication tests of random-versus xed-eects models strongly reject the hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The results of Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) and Geyer (2011) also suggest that a tobit model would not change any estimation results in a signicant way.
Data
The availability of suited data on individual or household saving behavior and employment dynamics at the same time might be one of the reasons why there has not been very much research on the subject of precautionary saving in Germany until recently. The data used here comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) (for a detailed description of the dataset, see Wagner et al. 2007) . 7 This interdisciplinary panel study has been carried out annually since 1984. Börsch-Supan and Essig (2003) and Basten et al. (2012) stress that many aspects of saving decisions can only be understood by using longitudinal data. Browning and Lusardi (1996) suggest a minimum of two business cycles (approximately 15 years) as a sucient survey period because ndings from shorter sample periods could be misleading due to common macro shocks. The saving measure that I use here has been available since 1992, which allows me to construct an unbalanced panel covering 19 years. While the GSOEP data on employment characteristics and income are numerous and very detailed, data on consumption and saving are not. However, the studies of Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005), Bartzsch (2008) , Beznoska and Ochmann (2010) as well as Freyland (2005), Bauer and Sinning (2011) , Giavazzi and McMahon (2010) , Fuchs-Schündeln (2008) and Geyer (2011) show that the GSOEP data can very well be utilized for the analysis of saving behavior. In the study at hand, household saving S it is the self-reported ow amount of monthly household saving as used in the latter ve studies mentioned above. Thus, the focus lies on adaptation of saving behavior due to changes in job insecurity in a longitudinal context, and not on the accumulation of wealth in a life-cycle context. The exact wording of this income screener-type question on household saving reads as follows: Do you usually have an amount of money left over at the end of the month that you can save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth? If yes, how much? This is a rather simple approach to approximate the true amount of saving per time. Stein (2009) and Freyland (2005) discuss the problems that surround this measure in detail. These include, e.g., measurement error arising from individuals not dening saving in an exhaustive way, the monthly time-frame, or the left-censored nature of the data. Nevertheless, this self-reported measure is well suited for studying precautionary saving behavior for two reasons. First, this measure captures better than others the fraction of total saving that households can adjust rather easily, i.e., the margin of total saving (Giavazzi and McMahon 2010) . This margin should respond to respond to unexpected changes in future employment or income risk if households engage in precautionary saving behavior. Second, monthly net income and monthly saving are reported by the households directly one after the other. Therefore, the subjective perception of the fraction of income that is put aside every month should be quite accurate. Due to the question design, no negative saving is observed. I attribute a value of 0 to all households that report not to put any money aside. 8 Comparing the GSOEP saving rate to that from the German national accounts, the former is on average about 2%-points lower. 9 This dierence is similar to that reported by Freyland (2005) and Bartzsch (2008) , but signicantly lower than that reported by Stein (2009) . However, it is not the absolute level of saving that matters for the estimation of precautionary saving here, but the relative change from one period to another. The left panel of Figure 1 plots my GSOEP and the national accounts saving rates for the years 1992 to 2010. The course of the saving rates accord reasonably well until the year 2001; the subsequent increase in the national accounts saving rate is not mirrored in my GSOEP data, though.
Figure 1: Development and distribution of the household saving rate by worries about job security, 1992 2010
Notes: GSOEP sample, see Section 3.3; data weighted using cross-sectional weights of the GSOEP. Source: GSOEP, German Bundesbank, own calculations As discussed in Section 2, subjective measures are best suited for the study of precautionary saving because they contain private forward-looking information. My risk measure R it is identied from information about subjective individual worries about job security available for all waves from 1992 to 2010. The question reads as follows: What is your attitude toward the following areas are you concerned about them? [. . . ] Your job security? [the answers being] very concerned, somewhat concerned, not concerned at all. This information is used to construct indicator variables reecting whether an individual is either somewhat or very worried about job security, or not at all. The GSOEP also includes another variable concerning job insecurity which I use in a robustness check: A self-reported job loss probability. In the years 1992 to 1994, 1996 and 1998, this question had 4 possible answer categories ranging from denitely not to denitely. Since 1999, this probability has been asked every two years with 11 answer categories ranging from 0% to 100%. The information on job worries is better suited for my investigation of precautionary saving behavior for three reasons: First, it is available for a longer time period without any gaps. Second, the loss of variability is limited because the answers to the more detailed question on the job loss probability are clustered at certain values, in particular at 0% and 50%. Third, the two questions are positioned dierently in the questionnaire. The subjective job loss probability is asked in a part on current employment characteristics at the beginning of the survey, whereas the subjective worries about job security are asked in a part on attitudes and opinions toward the end of the survey. Because of this framing and the wording, the former question likely captures a number of foreseeable job terminations that do not necessarily represent a risk to the individual, e.g., voluntary quits or ending temporary contracts. In contrast, the latter question specically captures the worries that surround the future employment situation of the respondents. Therefore, this question does not only capture the pure likelihood of a job loss, but also its consequences which is important for the interpretation of the variable as an adequate risk measure (Geishecker 2010 In order to check the validity of using the dummy variables for individual job security worries as risk measures in saving rate regressions, three descriptive analyses are carried out: First, Figure   1 shows that while people who worry about losing their job have lower saving rates (left panel), the distribution of the saving rate is not too dierent for dierent job security perceptions (right panel). That is, very low as well as very high saving rates are observed for people who worry about losing their job as well as for those without worries. Second, Figure 2 shows that the measure provides a sizable amount of variation over time between (right panel) as well as within (left panel)
individuals: Each year, about 30% of the observed individuals are either more or less worried about losing their job than in preceding year. The within-panel standard deviation of the job security measure amounts to more than 80% of the between-panel standard deviation.
Third, Figure 2 also suggests that the subjective job worries are meaningfully related to the corresponding state unemployment rates and thus to true unemployment risk. The relationship of expected and realized job losses is analyzed more closely by regressing realized job losses on socioeconomic characteristics and the subjective job loss worries as suggested by Stephens, Jr. (2004) . Table 2 reports the results from xed eects logit regressions for the risk of losing one's job due to 10 In the same section of the questionnaire, respondents are also asked about their worries regarding the development of the overall and their personal economic situation. Therefore, the respondents can be expected to distinguish between job security and their nancial situation, and endogeneity should be largely limited.
12 a dismissal or a company closure. Obviously, the inclusion of the subjective information about job insecurity greatly improves the estimation model: The subjective variables are strongly signicant and positive, the Pseudo R-squared almost doubles, and the information criteria greatly improve. 11 Table reports coecients from conditional xed eects logit regressions. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for losing the job due to a dismissal or a company closure within the subsequent year. Columns (1999 2009 ) only include data from every second wave. All regressions include sector, occupation, company size and federal state dummies. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations
The richness of the GSOEP data allows the vector of control variables X it to include a large number of income, household, personal, job, and nancial and wealth characteristics in order to control for the most important aspects that inuence household saving decisions, and to isolate the pure eect of job insecurity. I use the same income measure as Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005), Bauer and Sinning (2011) and Freyland (2005) : The self-reported household net monthly income which is reported by the households directly before the saving information. Following Giavazzi and McMahon (2010) , the change in monthly household income in real 2010 EUR is used whenever ΔSR it is employed as the dependent variable in the regression analysis. 12 In contrast to many other studies, no measure of permanent income is used because the focus is not on wealth holdings over 11 The results also hold for random eects regressions and when a dummy variable for being unemployed in the subsequent year is used as the dependent variable.
12 Dierent income specications (e.g., quadratic terms, income quantile dummies, or splines) were tested, and never aected any estimation results. 13 the life cycle, but on adaptation of saving behavior due to changes in risk perceptions. 13
Household composition is known to have a strong inuence on consumption and saving behavior (Freyland 2005) . Here, the household size, and dummy variables that indicate if the main earner of the household is married, divorced or widowed, has any children, owns a home, or resides in Eastern Germany are included. In addition, two dummies indicating if a partner household relies on one income only or has two or more income sources; the reference group comprises single households.
Regarding personal characteristics of the household's main income earner (see Section 3.3), age, age squared and age cubed are included to allow for a dierent saving behavior at dierent points in life. I also include dummy variables for the self-rated current health status because health changes can strongly aect current income and expenditures, and thus current saving potential. In addition, I include dummy variables for being a blue collar worker or a civil servant. In robustness checks, I add more job and employment characteristics (e.g., tenure, company size, industry sector, unemployment experience) or dummy variables for panel attrition in the regressions. In all regressions, year dummies are included and interacted with the dummy for Eastern Germany to account for macroeconomic eects and the immediate response and adaptation of saving in Eastern Germany after the large shock of German reunication (Fuchs-Schündeln 2008) . Table 3 lists all variables used in the baseline specication of the empirical analysis.
Sample construction
Since the saving data are only available at the household level but many of the explanatory variables especially the measure of job insecurity are recorded for the individual household members, one must attribute the individual characteristics to the respective household. Following the approach of Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) , the household data is merged with the characteristics of the main income earner. The main income earner is dened as the person who has the highest net monthly labor income, i.e., higher than that of the partner or any other household member.
For those households with two or more main income earners, the person who is the head of the household remains in the sample. 14 The sample is restricted as follows in order to exclude households that have a very dierent saving behavior, and to make the ndings comparable to previous studies. First, measurement error that arises through the utilization of self-reported saving and income measures is reduced: Only households that report reasonable saving rates of less than or equal to 0.5 are included. Households that report unreasonably low income, i.e., less than EUR 500 per month, and those with extremely high income, i.e., more than EUR 15,000 per month, are excluded. The same applies to main earners with a monthly labor income of less than EUR 300 or more than EUR 15,000. 15 Households in which the income share of the main earner exceeds 200% are also excluded.
Job insecurity being the main explanatory variable of interest, all individuals that are unemployed, 13 Since I only estimate xed eects regressions, a measure of permanent income cannot be included due to a lack of within-panel variation.
14 In addition, the main income earner has to be the head of the household, her partner or her spouse, and the household questionnaire must have been answered by the head of the household, her partner or her spouse. In the nal sample, 75% are the household head, and 25% the partner. Within household changes of the main earner are rare and addressed in a sensitivity analysis. They do not impact on the results.
15 These values are all based on the 1st and 99th percentile of the income distributions but less strict.
apprentices, trainees or interns are disregarded. Focusing on the working population, only households whose main income earner is between the age of 18 and the age of 60 are included. Especially younger households might be relevant for the study of precautionary saving because these households have not yet established a buer-stock of wealth (Carroll 1997 4 Estimation results Table 3 reports the mean values and standard deviations of the variables included in the regression analysis separately for those households that are not worried about job security, those that are somewhat worried, and those that are very worried. The self-reported probability of a job loss and the state unemployment rate increase with job worries as one would expect, which lends support to the assumption that subjective job worries adequately reect the job loss risk of the individuals/households. The saving measures turn out to be lower for households that worry about losing their job: The share of households that are able to save is 18%-points lower for those who are very worried compared to those who are not worried; the saving rates are 7.4% and 11.2%, respectively, and the amount of monthly saving is more than EUR 150, i.e., more than 40%, lower for the very worried households. Those who worry also have a signicantly lower monthly income.
In sum, these descriptive statistics clearly show that job security and nancial well-being typically go hand-in-hand. That is, households in a secure employment situation typically nd themselves in a sound nancial situation, too. In contrast, households at risk of losing their job typically 16 The age of 60 instead of the ocial retirement age of 65 is chosen because of the possibility of early retirement. In Germany, retired households save substantial amounts, contradicting the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis (Börsch-Supan and Essig 2003) . While this behavior cannot be explained by unemployment risk, it might reect precautionary behavior with regard to uncertainty surrounding health expenditures and longevity. Note: Pooled data from 1992 2010, weighted using cross-sectional weights of the GSOEP. Source: GSOEP, own calculations acquire and possess less wealth. This also shows when looking at the subjective perception of the own nancial situation: While only 7% of households that are not worried about job security are worried about their nancial situation, 63% of those that are very worried about job security are also very worried about their nancial situation. Therefore, any empirical analysis that compares saving behavior or wealth holdings between households or individuals likely nds saving or wealth to be negatively related to job insecurity. Concerning household and personal characteristics of the main income earner, no unexpected large dierences emerge: Very worried individuals are in slightly worse health and less likely to own a home, but more likely to live in the Eastern part of Germany. The standard deviations also suggest that common support for the saving and job security measures is given. That is, the distributions of the saving and the job security measures largely overlap for dierent socio-economic characteristics. 17 The use of xed eects estimation models takes care of unobserved dierences between households as long as this heterogeneity is time-invariant because the relationship between the explanatory variables and the saving rate is only identied from changes in the variables within households over time. For this estimation approach to deliver meaningful results, enough within-panel variation of the key variables is needed. In addition, endogeneity due to reverse causality or time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is a concern, especially because I use a very subjective indicator as the main explanatory variable. Regarding variation, the discussion in Section 3.2 shows that there is a lot of variation in my job security measure that can be exploited to identify a correlation between saving and job security. The saving measures also oer enough variation over time: For the saving rate, the within-panel standard deviation amounts to 75% of the between-panel standard deviation.
With regards to the exogeneity of the included explanatory variables, reverse causality, i.e., a causal impact of household saving on personal job security concerns, seems to be highly unlikely (Arent 2012) . Saving and consumption must be considered the outcome of an economic optimization problem: Given current and expected future income, a household decides how much money to spend and save in a particular year. All of the included explanatory variables are chosen because they represent possibly important determinants of saving behavior that are set before the saving decision is made, in particular the income situation and household composition. Time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is more critical issue for the interpretation of the estimation results. It is possible that unobserved factors not included in the regressions aect saving behavior and job insecurity simultaneously. It is not too obvious which factors this could be. One candidate is a shock to the nancial situation of the household which I address in more detail below. Although the risk of an endogeneity bias should be limited, the estimation results must be primarily seen as descriptive evidence for the link between job insecurity and household saving behavior. The coecients of the xed eects regressions must be interpreted as deviations from household-specic saving trends holding the other confounding variables, especially income, constant. Table 4 reports the results of my baseline regressions for the explanation of changes in the household saving rate over time. The rst column shows the results of the preferred specication with the rst dierence of the saving rate ΔSR it as the dependent variable. The results presented in the second to fourth columns refer to the level of the saving rate SR it ; and the last column presents results from a xed eects logit regression model for the probability to have a positive saving rate P (SR it > 0). None of the regression coecients for the job insecurity dummies support the hypothesis of precautionary saving behavior. Instead, current job worries and current saving are rather negatively correlated. That is, households whose perceived job insecurity increases save less. While these negative correlations are not statistically dierent from zero for ΔSR it , they are statistically signicant in the other four specications. In economic terms, the households that are somewhat or very worried about job security have on average controlling for income, personal and household characteristics a 0.3 and 0.5%-points lower saving rate, respectively. The respective deviations from the household-specic trend in the saving rate are only 0.1 and 0.15%-points. Overall, the ndings suggest that changes in job security perceptions do not impact much on concurrent saving behavior. The dierence between the results for the change and the level of the saving rate can be attributed to job security-specic time trends in the saving rate as depicted in Figure 1 : The higher the job worries, the steeper the decline in saving over time, which speaks against job insecurity motivating precautionary saving. In order to account for these dierent trends, I stick to the specication with ΔSR it as the dependent variable. Table reports coecients from linear xed eects and conditional xed eects logit regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households (except for the logit regression). The dependent variable is either the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points), the level of the saving rate (in %-points), or a dummy variable that indicates a positive saving rate. All regressions additionally include year dummies, a dummy for Eastern Germany and their interactions. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations As mentioned above, this preferred specication also accounts for the left-censoring issue of the saving variable (Giavazzi and McMahon 2010) . When the level of the saving rate is used, the results for the dierent samples show the possible importance of the censoring issue, especially with regard to income: For the samples of all households (including those with zero saving) and of those households that report a positive saving rate at least once, the correlation between income and the saving rate is much stronger than for the sample of only households with a positive saving rate. The conditional xed eects logit model strengthens the importance of the censoring issue concerning household income, but much less so concerning job worries. Since the coecients of the job insecurity dummies do not dier signicantly across the three samples of the saving rate level regressions, I conclude that my job security-specic results are largely immune to a censoring problem, especially in the specication in spirit of Giavazzi and McMahon (2010) . Current household income is of course by far the most important determinant of saving. Concerning the other confounding variables, the estimation results accord well with economic theory and plain intuition: Occupational changes are not signicantly related to household saving, but the respective coecients are only identied from a rather low number of observations. A signicant age pattern emerges for the saving rate level regressions, but not for the ΔSR it -specication. A better health status, which implies a better economic standing as well as less health-related expenditures, is related to higher saving. Not surprisingly, saving behavior is signicantly related to changes in the family status or household composition. Buying an own house is associated with a much lower reported saving rate. 18 While each of the included covariates potentially represents an important saving determinant in its own right, their main purpose here is to control for possible confounding eects concerning the relationship of job security perceptions and saving behavior. Therefore, the corresponding estimation results are not discussed in the following analyses. But since subjective data must be used with due caution in applied microeconometric research, a number of robustness checks are carried out to test the sensitivity of the baseline estimation results with regard to the most important underlying assumptions. The rst robustness checks are concerned with the dependent and, in particular, the job insecurity variables. When the amount, and not the rate of monthly saving is used as the dependent variable, either in rst dierences or in logarithms, the results remain unchanged (see Table A in the Appendix): Job insecurity perceptions are negatively correlated with saving. In the case of rst dierences, the correlations are insignicant in statistical as well as economic terms; in the case of saving levels, the correlations are partly statistically signicant and non-negligible in terms of size: Being very worried about job security is related to an up to 13% or EUR 40 lower monthly saving amount. No signs of precautionary behavior emerge. Since using the amount instead of the rate of saving as the dependent variable implies a dierent functional relationship between income and saving, one can also be reassured that the precise modeling of this relationship does not aect the estimation results for job insecurity. 19 When changes in the worries about job security are used as risk measures, i.e., indicator variables for being more or less worried than in the year before, the results remain robust, too. The same applies to the use of the self-rated job loss probability on a scale from 0% to 100%, as can be seen from Table 5 . The signicant coecients for being more or less worried speak very strongly against precautionary behavior by suggesting that an increase (decrease) in job worries is accompanied by a negative (positive) deviation from trend saving of approximately 0.25%-points. The stronger correlations for the dummy variables indicating changes in job worries also suggest that the deviation from the household-specic saving trend is stronger in the short than in the long run. There is also no evidence for precautionary behavior when the subjective job loss probability is used. As this variable is available every second year from 1999 to 2009, the regressions using the other risk measures are also run for this time frame, yielding very similar results which suggest that the ndings are not overly sensitive to the choice of the time period. Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points). Regressions in columns 1999 2009 only include data from every second wave. All regressions include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 4 . Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations Further robustness checks are concerned with particular sample restrictions and variable specications are reported in the Appendix, Table C . In all cases, the correlation between job worries and saving is negative and slightly stronger than in the baseline regressions, but still insignicant in most cases. This applies to (1) changing the panel dimension from the household to the individual level, (2) the exclusion all households whose main earner changes, (3) the inclusion of dummy variables which indicate if a household is observed in the preceding or following year, (4) a common support sample that only includes households that have a reasonable estimated propensity to be in any of the three job worry categories 20 , (5) the exclusion of large income changes of more than EUR 1,000 (top and bottom percentile of the income changes distribution), (6) the inclusion of important job characteristics (e.g., tenure, required training, industry sector, company size), (7) the exclusion of civil servants, and (8) the inclusion of household asset income in the last year as a proxy variable for the wealth situation of the household. Clearly, the estimation results negate the existence of 20 The propensity for being not, somewhat or very worried about job security is estimated using an ordered probit model with the same explanatory variables as in the saving regressions. The households in the common support sample have predicted propensities between 20% and 60%, 30% and 50% and 4% and 40%, respectively. Appendix Figure A plots the corresponding propensity scores. 20 precautionary saving behavior, households do not raise but rather lower their concurrent saving when perceived job insecurity increases. While the descriptive evidence for a negative correlation of job worries and saving is strong and robust, an interpretation of this correlation as a purely causal relationship is less convincing.
Baseline estimations

Accounting for changes in the nancial situation
The major concern one might have when a subjective measure of job insecurity is used in a regression analysis, is time-varying unobserved heterogeneity which could render any observed correlation between job insecurity and household saving spurious. The information about job worries stems from a section in the household questionnaire of the GSOEP that asks a battery of questions related to dierent worries a household might have. Since 1992, households have been asked each year about their worries regarding their own nancial situation, the overall economic development, the ecological environment and world peace. 21 One can presume a strong negative relationship between worries about the own nancial situation and saving because households that are unable to save are likely concerned about their wealth situation (see Table 3 ). In contrast, worries about the economy, the environment or peace can condently be regarded as unrelated to the personal saving behavior. This allows me to test whether some unobserved shock aects the correlation between job insecurity and saving simply via the reporting behavior of the individual. If reporting behavior was generally distorted by an unobserved event that is also related to lower saving, a negative correlation with saving should be found particularly for the global questions. But the results in Table 6 strongly suggest that a common reporting bias can be ruled out. The correlations between the macroeconomic worries and saving are mostly insignicant; in the case of large environmental worries, even a signicantly positive relationship shows. In addition, the correlations of these worries with the job insecurity or nancial worries are rather low (see lower part of Table 6 ).
In contrast, the correlation between job insecurity and nancial worries is not negligible. Hence, while a reporting bias is unlikely, the documented small negative correlation between job insecurity and saving might well be aected by simultaneous changes in the nancial situation of the household. Table 6 shows a strong negative correlation (statistically and economically) between nancial worries and household saving, which must be attributed to reverse causality of low saving leading to nancial worries. 22 In order to control for changes in a household's nancial situation, I add the corresponding subjective worries as explanatory variables to the baseline specication from Table 4 . Of course, this approach can only be seen as an experiment because including the worries about the nancial situation creates an endogeneity problem. 23 The results in the last column of Table 7 suggest that nancial constraints are indeed one main reason why no evidence for precautionary saving behavior due to job security perceptions is found: When controlling for nancial worries, negative job security perceptions are positively related to saving. However, the correlations are small and not Table 4 . "Somewhat worried" and "Very worried" refer to the column headlines. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations statistically dierent from zero.
A dierent and less critical approach to account for the nancial situation of the households is to split the sample according to their nancial worries. That is, the baseline specication is estimated separately for households who are either not at all or somewhat or very worried about their own nancial situation. This approach is much less prone to endogeneity problems because households whose perception of nancial security changes do not contribute to the identication of the coecients of the job security variables in each of the three xed eects regressions. The estimation results show the correlation of perceived job insecurity and saving behavior conditional on nancial worries.
The corresponding estimation results are presented in Table 7 . For those households that are not or very worried about their nancial situation, no signicant correlations are found: Being somewhat concerned about job security is related to a small decrease in saving, being very concerned to an even smaller increase in saving. In contrast, the change in saving of those households that are somewhat worried about their nancial situation is approximately 0.3%-points higher when these households worry about losing their jobs. Statistically, the correlation is only signicantly dierent from zero in case of being somewhat worried, at the 5%-signicance level. Economically, the relationship is small, but not negligible: The deviation from the household-specic trend in saving of 0.3%-points translates into a higher annual saving of approximately EUR 100.
The results for the dierent samples suggest that the link between job insecurity and saving behavior is subject to a considerable degree of heterogeneity related to the wealth situation of the households. In essence, three groups of household must be distinguished: For the rst group, job and nancial insecurity go hand-in-hand. These households are nancially constrained and unable to raise their saving. The second group is in a nancially sound situation and thus does not need to adjust saving behavior, e.g., because they have already established a large enough buer-stock of wealth (Carroll 1997) . The third group is somewhere in-between. For these households, changes Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points). All regressions include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 4 . Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations in perceived job security are related to current saving behavior in a way that supports the idea of precautionary behavior.
Motivated by the studies of, e.g., Benito (2006) , Schunk (2009) and Giavazzi and McMahon (2010) , I split the sample not only by nancial worries, but also by the age and the type of the household (The results are reported in the Appendix, Tables D and E, respectively). 24 Positive regression coecients are again mainly found for those households that are somewhat worried about their nancial situation, and less often for those that are not or very concerned. Overall, the results suggest an even larger degree of heterogeneity. That is, the relationship between perceived job security and saving behavior also varies with age or household type. However, the estimation results do not show any clear patterns. Tentatively, job insecurity seems to be related more strongly to the saving of older than of younger households, and less strongly to the saving of households with 2 or more income sources. The latter nding could be interpreted as slight evidence for risk sharing within households (Lusardi 1998 , Browning 2000 , Mazzocco 2004 ). The strongest statistically signicant positive coecient is found for partner households who are somewhat worried about their nancial situation and rely on one income only. For them, being worried about job security is related to an almost 1%-point higher saving rate. The strongest negative correlation is found for households between the age of 30 and 40, for whom being somewhat worried about job security is related to a 1%-point lower saving rate.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, I study the relationship between perceived job insecurity and household saving behavior with large-scale micro-data from the 1992 to 2010 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel. In the empirical analysis, rst dierences of the household saving rate are regressed on a subjective measure of job insecurity and predetermined confounding variables in order to control for household-specic saving trends and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The subjective risk measure captures the typically unobserved private concerns about a possible job loss. By and large, the estimation results suggest that (changes in) job insecurity and concurrent saving are rather negatively, but not strongly related neither statistically nor economically. While a general reporting bias can be condently ruled out, the negative correlation between job insecurity and saving partly reects that job worries are accompanied by worries about the own nancial situation. That is, employment and nancial security deteriorate or improve simultaneously in many cases.
When the perception of the nancial situation is accounted for, saving behavior is positively, but not signicantly correlated to increase in job insecurity. In particular, evidence of small precautionary saving behavior emerges for households that are somewhat worried about their nancial situation: These households raise their saving rate by approximately 0.3%-points or EUR 100 annually when worried about a job loss. In contrast, no signicant correlations between job worries and saving are found for households that are either not at all or very concerned about their nancial situation. I interpret these results as a non-linear impact of household wealth on the relationship between job insecurity and ow saving. Households at the bottom of the wealth distribution are nancially constrained and thus unable to adapt their saving behavior; households in the middle of the distribution show signs of precautionary behavior by raising their saving; households at the top of the distribution have already established a buer-stock of wealth and thus do not need to change their saving behavior.
My results of no or only very limited precautionary saving behavior due to job insecurity in Germany support the ndings of Essig (2005b) and Arent (2012) , but not those of Geyer (2011) .
One reason for non-existent precautionary saving can be seen in the fairly generous German public unemployment insurance system which might crowd out private wealth accumulation (Gruber 1998, Engen and Gruber 2001) . However, as job security and nancial worries appear to be very closely related for many households, a public unemployment insurance is likely needed to cover nancially constrained households who cannot adequately protect themselves against income depletions caused by unemployment.
Since I particularly study changes in the ow of saving, it is dicult to relate my results to the economic literature that looks at wealth holdings, i.e., the stock of savings. Non-existent precautionary saving behavior at the top of the wealth distribution might well be explained by the existence of a buer-stock of precautionary savings due to job insecurity (e.g., Lusardi 1998 , Carroll et al. 2003 , Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005 . The relationships of job insecurity with saving or savings must be carefully distinguished and both represent important research questions in their own rights. What carries over from my study to those that investigate household wealth is the importance of nancial constraints that a sizable number of households face, roughly one quarter of all households in my sample: These households typically face the highest unemployment risk and thus constitute a high-risk group with regard to economic well-being.
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Appendix: Additional tables and gures Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is either the change in the amount of self-reported household saving (in logs), or the level of monthly household saving (in logs). All regressions additionally include year dummies, a dummy for Eastern Germany and their interactions. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations 29 Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points). All regressions include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 4 . Income quintiles are based on equivalized household income (income divided by the square root of the household size). Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations 30 Notes: Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points). All regressions include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 4 . Column Panel attrition also includes dummy variables for being observed in the preceding and subsequent years, column Job characteristics tenure, unemployment experience and dummies for company size, industry sector, public employer, temporary work contract and being trained for the specic job, and column Incl. asset income Δ household asset income as additional explanatory variables. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations 31 Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points). All regressions include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 4 . Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations 32 Table reports coecients from linear xed eects regressions, std. errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering on households. The dependent variable is the change in the self-reported household saving rate (in %-points). All regressions include the same control variables as the regressions in Table 4 . Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1% Source: GSOEP, own calculations 33 Table 4 . GSOEP sample, see Section 3.3. Source: GSOEP, own calculations
